Using weight decision for decreasing the price of anarchy in selfish bin packing games

Gyorgy Dosa, Hans Kellerer, Z. Tuza

Research output: Article

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A selfish bin packing game is a variant of the classical bin packing problem in a game theoretic setting. In our model the items have not only a size but also a nonnegative weight. Each item plays the role of a selfish agent, and any agent/item pays some cost for being in a bin. The cost of a bin is 1, and this cost is shared among the items being in the bin, proportionally to their weight. A packing of the items into bins is called a Nash equilibrium if no item can decrease its cost by moving to another bin. In this paper we present two different settings for the weights which provide better values for the price of anarchy (PoA) than previous settings investigated so far. The improved PoA is not bigger than 16/11 ≈ 1.4545. Moreover, we give a general lower bound for the price of anarchy which holds for all possible choices of the weights.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)160-169
Number of pages10
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume278
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - okt. 1 2019

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Information Systems and Management

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Using weight decision for decreasing the price of anarchy in selfish bin packing games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this