Reentrant phase transitions and defensive alliances in social dilemmas with informed strategies

Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc

Research output: Article

28 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Knowing the strategy of an opponent in a competitive environment conveys obvious evolutionary advantages. But this information is costly, and the benefit of being informed may not necessarily offset the additional cost. Here we introduce social dilemmas with informed strategies, and we show that this gives rise to two cyclically dominant triplets that form defensive alliances. The stability of these two alliances is determined by the rotation velocity of the strategies within each triplet. A weaker strategy in a faster rotating triplet can thus overcome an individually stronger competitor. Fascinating spatial patterns favor the dominance of a single defensive alliance, but enable also the stable coexistence of both defensive alliances in very narrow regions of the parameter space. A continuous reentrant phase transition reveals before unseen complexity behind the stability of strategic alliances in evolutionary social dilemmas.

Original languageEnglish
Article number38003
JournalEPL
Volume110
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - máj. 1 2015

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Physics and Astronomy(all)

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