"Ki szép, ki jó?" Az attraktivitás hatása a harmadik személyu″ büntetésre, jutalmazásra

Translated title of the contribution: "Who's beautiful, who's good?" The effect of attractiveness on third-party punishment and reward

Ádám Putz, Róbert Palotai, T. Bereczkei

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

According to DION, BERSCHEID and WALSTER (1972) people tend to assume that highly attractive individuals possess more socially desirable personality traits (e.g. "altruistic") than those of lesser attractiveness. In a game involving trust and reciprocity WILSON and ECKEL (2006) found that attrac tive trustees were viewed as more trustworthy; should they fail to reciprocate however, participants inflict larger punishments on them than on less attractive cheaters ("beauty penalty"). In our study we intended to analyse how attractiveness affects the social norm enforcement in a third-party punishing and rewarding context. The Third-party Punishment and Reward Game (TPRG) consisted out of two steps. First the participants had to observe a short "Public Goods Game" between two fictitious individuals, and then they had the opportunity to punish and/or to reward either just one or both players. Interfering in the game was costly for the participants. Among the eight rounds of the game there were stereotype consistent (attractive co-operators with unattractive freeriders) and stereotype inconsistent (attractive free-riders with unattractive co-operators) scenarios. All of our 115 participants (58 females and 57 males) were volunteer undergraduate university students, aged between 18 and 31 years (mean = 21.2; SD = 2.12). In line with WILSON and ECKEL (2006) we found that attractive free-riders were punished more severely than unattractive ones. Additionally participants rewarded unattractive co-operators more than those of higher attractiveness. Thus we can conclude that stereotype inconsistent scenarios evoke more extreme interventions than stereotype consistent scenarios did.

Original languageHungarian
Pages (from-to)215-231
Number of pages17
JournalMagyar Pszichologiai Szemle
Volume70
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 1 2015

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Punishment
Reward
Trustees
Beauty
Personality
Volunteers
Students
Social Norms

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Psychology(all)

Cite this

"Ki szép, ki jó?" Az attraktivitás hatása a harmadik személyu″ büntetésre, jutalmazásra. / Putz, Ádám; Palotai, Róbert; Bereczkei, T.

In: Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle, Vol. 70, No. 1, 01.03.2015, p. 215-231.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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