Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols

L. Buttyán, István Vajda

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

78 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We propose a formal framework for the security analysis of on-demand source routing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks. Our approach is based on the well-known simulation paradigm that has been proposed to prove the security of cryptographic protocols. Our main contribution is the application of the simulation-based approach in the context of ad hoc routing. This involves a precise definition of a real-world model, which describes the real operation of the protocol, and an ideal-world model, which captures what the protocol wants to achieve in terms of security. Both models take into account the peculiarities of wireless communications and ad hoc routing. Then, we give a formal definition of routing security in terms of indistinguishability of the two models from the point of view of honest parties. We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by analyzing two "secure" ad hoc routing protocols, SRP and Ariadne. This analysis leads to the discovery of as yet unknown attacks against both protocols. Finally, we propose a new ad hoc routing protocol and prove it to be secure in our model.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04
EditorsV. Swarup, S. Setia
Pages94-105
Number of pages12
Publication statusPublished - 2004
EventProceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04 - Washington, DC, United States
Duration: Oct 25 2004Oct 25 2004

Other

OtherProceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04
CountryUnited States
CityWashington, DC
Period10/25/0410/25/04

Fingerprint

Routing protocols
Network protocols
Wireless ad hoc networks
Communication

Keywords

  • Ad Hoc Networks
  • On-demand Source Routing
  • Provable Security
  • Routing Protocols
  • Simulatability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

Buttyán, L., & Vajda, I. (2004). Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols. In V. Swarup, & S. Setia (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04 (pp. 94-105)

Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols. / Buttyán, L.; Vajda, István.

Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04. ed. / V. Swarup; S. Setia. 2004. p. 94-105.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Buttyán, L & Vajda, I 2004, Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols. in V Swarup & S Setia (eds), Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04. pp. 94-105, Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04, Washington, DC, United States, 10/25/04.
Buttyán L, Vajda I. Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols. In Swarup V, Setia S, editors, Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04. 2004. p. 94-105
Buttyán, L. ; Vajda, István. / Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols. Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04. editor / V. Swarup ; S. Setia. 2004. pp. 94-105
@inproceedings{6663b18a9baf4b79b16ae6088bc047f1,
title = "Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols",
abstract = "We propose a formal framework for the security analysis of on-demand source routing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks. Our approach is based on the well-known simulation paradigm that has been proposed to prove the security of cryptographic protocols. Our main contribution is the application of the simulation-based approach in the context of ad hoc routing. This involves a precise definition of a real-world model, which describes the real operation of the protocol, and an ideal-world model, which captures what the protocol wants to achieve in terms of security. Both models take into account the peculiarities of wireless communications and ad hoc routing. Then, we give a formal definition of routing security in terms of indistinguishability of the two models from the point of view of honest parties. We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by analyzing two {"}secure{"} ad hoc routing protocols, SRP and Ariadne. This analysis leads to the discovery of as yet unknown attacks against both protocols. Finally, we propose a new ad hoc routing protocol and prove it to be secure in our model.",
keywords = "Ad Hoc Networks, On-demand Source Routing, Provable Security, Routing Protocols, Simulatability",
author = "L. Butty{\'a}n and Istv{\'a}n Vajda",
year = "2004",
language = "English",
isbn = "1581139721",
pages = "94--105",
editor = "V. Swarup and S. Setia",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols

AU - Buttyán, L.

AU - Vajda, István

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - We propose a formal framework for the security analysis of on-demand source routing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks. Our approach is based on the well-known simulation paradigm that has been proposed to prove the security of cryptographic protocols. Our main contribution is the application of the simulation-based approach in the context of ad hoc routing. This involves a precise definition of a real-world model, which describes the real operation of the protocol, and an ideal-world model, which captures what the protocol wants to achieve in terms of security. Both models take into account the peculiarities of wireless communications and ad hoc routing. Then, we give a formal definition of routing security in terms of indistinguishability of the two models from the point of view of honest parties. We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by analyzing two "secure" ad hoc routing protocols, SRP and Ariadne. This analysis leads to the discovery of as yet unknown attacks against both protocols. Finally, we propose a new ad hoc routing protocol and prove it to be secure in our model.

AB - We propose a formal framework for the security analysis of on-demand source routing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks. Our approach is based on the well-known simulation paradigm that has been proposed to prove the security of cryptographic protocols. Our main contribution is the application of the simulation-based approach in the context of ad hoc routing. This involves a precise definition of a real-world model, which describes the real operation of the protocol, and an ideal-world model, which captures what the protocol wants to achieve in terms of security. Both models take into account the peculiarities of wireless communications and ad hoc routing. Then, we give a formal definition of routing security in terms of indistinguishability of the two models from the point of view of honest parties. We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by analyzing two "secure" ad hoc routing protocols, SRP and Ariadne. This analysis leads to the discovery of as yet unknown attacks against both protocols. Finally, we propose a new ad hoc routing protocol and prove it to be secure in our model.

KW - Ad Hoc Networks

KW - On-demand Source Routing

KW - Provable Security

KW - Routing Protocols

KW - Simulatability

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=14844337112&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=14844337112&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 1581139721

SP - 94

EP - 105

BT - Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04

A2 - Swarup, V.

A2 - Setia, S.

ER -