Spontaneous cooperation in multi-domain sensor networks

L. Buttyán, Tamás Holczer, Péter Schaffer

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Sensor networks are large scale networks consisting of several nodes and some base stations. The nodes are monitoring the environment and send their measurement data towards the base stations possibly via multiple hops. Since the nodes are often battery powered, an important design criterion for sensor networks is the maximization of their lifetime. In this paper, we consider multi-domain sensor networks, by which we mean a set of sensor networks that co-exist at the same physical location but run by different authorities. In this setting, the lifetime of all networks can be increased if the nodes cooperate and also forward packets originating from foreign domains. There is a risk, however, that a selfish network takes advantage of the cooperativeness of the other networks and exploits them. We study this problem in a game theoretic setting, and show that, in most cases, there is a Nash equilibrium in the system, in which at least one of the strategies is cooperative, even without introducing any external incentives (e.g., payments).

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Pages42-53
Number of pages12
Volume3813 LNCS
Publication statusPublished - 2005
EventSecond European Workshop on Security and Privacy in Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks, ESAS 2005 - Visegrad, Hungary
Duration: Jul 13 2005Jul 14 2005

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume3813 LNCS
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Other

OtherSecond European Workshop on Security and Privacy in Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks, ESAS 2005
CountryHungary
CityVisegrad
Period7/13/057/14/05

Fingerprint

Humulus
Sensor networks
Sensor Networks
Motivation
Vertex of a graph
Base stations
Lifetime
Incentives
Nash Equilibrium
Battery
Monitoring
Game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Theoretical Computer Science

Cite this

Buttyán, L., Holczer, T., & Schaffer, P. (2005). Spontaneous cooperation in multi-domain sensor networks. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 3813 LNCS, pp. 42-53). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 3813 LNCS).

Spontaneous cooperation in multi-domain sensor networks. / Buttyán, L.; Holczer, Tamás; Schaffer, Péter.

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). Vol. 3813 LNCS 2005. p. 42-53 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 3813 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Buttyán, L, Holczer, T & Schaffer, P 2005, Spontaneous cooperation in multi-domain sensor networks. in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). vol. 3813 LNCS, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 3813 LNCS, pp. 42-53, Second European Workshop on Security and Privacy in Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks, ESAS 2005, Visegrad, Hungary, 7/13/05.
Buttyán L, Holczer T, Schaffer P. Spontaneous cooperation in multi-domain sensor networks. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). Vol. 3813 LNCS. 2005. p. 42-53. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
Buttyán, L. ; Holczer, Tamás ; Schaffer, Péter. / Spontaneous cooperation in multi-domain sensor networks. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). Vol. 3813 LNCS 2005. pp. 42-53 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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