Spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with three strategies and external constraints

György Szabó, Tibor Antal, Péter Szabó, Michel Droz

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80 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The emergency of mutual cooperation is analyzed in a spatially extended evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game. The players are located on the sites of cubic lattices for dimensions d = 1, 2, and 3. Three neighboring strategies such as cooperation, defection, and tit for tat, can be adopted by the players in the absence and presence of externally enforced cooperation. The external constraint imposes that the players always cooperate with probability p. The stationary state phase diagram is computed by both using generalized mean-field approximations and Monte Carlo simulations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1095-1103
Number of pages9
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical Physics, Plasmas, Fluids, and Related Interdisciplinary Topics
Volume62
Issue number1 B
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 1 2000

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Condensed Matter Physics

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