Social dilemmas in multistrategy evolutionary potential games

G. Szabó, Gergely Bunth

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The nature of social dilemmas is studied in n-strategy evolutionary potential games on a square lattice with nearest-neighbor interactions and the logit rule. For symmetric games with symmetric payoff matrices there are no dilemmas because of the coincidence of individual and common interests. The dilemmas are caused by the antisymmetric parts of the self- and cross-dependent payoff components if it modifies the preferred Nash equilibrium. The contentment of players and the emergence of dilemmas in the preferred Nash equilibria are illustrated on some two-dimensional cross sections of the parameter space.

Original languageEnglish
Article number012305
JournalPhysical Review E
Volume97
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 11 2018

Fingerprint

Potential Games
Social Dilemma
Evolutionary Game
Dilemma
games
Nash Equilibrium
Logit
Antisymmetric
Coincidence
Symmetric matrix
Square Lattice
Parameter Space
Nearest Neighbor
cross sections
Cross section
matrices
Game
Dependent
interactions
Interaction

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics

Cite this

Social dilemmas in multistrategy evolutionary potential games. / Szabó, G.; Bunth, Gergely.

In: Physical Review E, Vol. 97, No. 1, 012305, 11.01.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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