Simple logic for authentication protocol design

L. Buttyán, Sebastian Staamann, Uwe Wilhelm

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

35 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we describe a simple logic. The logic uses the notion of channels that are generalisations of communication links with various security properties. The abstract nature of channels enables us to treat the protocol at a higher abstraction level than do most of the known logics for authentication, and thus, we can address the higher level functional properties of the system, without having to be concerned with the problems of the actual implementation. The major advantage of the proposed logic is its suitability for the design of authentication protocols. We give a set of synthetic rules that can be used by protocol designers to construct a protocol in a systematic way.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop
Editors Anon
Pages153-162
Number of pages10
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1998
EventProceedings of the 1998 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, CSFW - Rockport, MA, USA
Duration: Jun 9 1998Jun 11 1998

Other

OtherProceedings of the 1998 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, CSFW
CityRockport, MA, USA
Period6/9/986/11/98

Fingerprint

Authentication
Telecommunication links

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software

Cite this

Buttyán, L., Staamann, S., & Wilhelm, U. (1998). Simple logic for authentication protocol design. In Anon (Ed.), Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop (pp. 153-162) https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1998.683165

Simple logic for authentication protocol design. / Buttyán, L.; Staamann, Sebastian; Wilhelm, Uwe.

Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop. ed. / Anon. 1998. p. 153-162.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Buttyán, L, Staamann, S & Wilhelm, U 1998, Simple logic for authentication protocol design. in Anon (ed.), Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop. pp. 153-162, Proceedings of the 1998 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, CSFW, Rockport, MA, USA, 6/9/98. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1998.683165
Buttyán L, Staamann S, Wilhelm U. Simple logic for authentication protocol design. In Anon, editor, Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop. 1998. p. 153-162 https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1998.683165
Buttyán, L. ; Staamann, Sebastian ; Wilhelm, Uwe. / Simple logic for authentication protocol design. Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop. editor / Anon. 1998. pp. 153-162
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