Seventeen-month-olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret others' referential communication

Victoria Southgate, Coralie Chevallier, G. Csibra

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

156 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recent studies have demonstrated infants' pragmatic abilities for resolving the referential ambiguity of non-verbal communicative gestures, and for inferring the intended meaning of a communicator's utterances. These abilities are difficult to reconcile with the view that it is not until around 4 years that children can reason about the internal mental states of others. In the current study, we tested whether 17-month-old infants are able to track the status of a communicator's epistemic state and use this to infer what she intends to refer to. Our results show that manipulating whether or not a communicator has a false belief leads infants to different interpretations of the same communicative act, and demonstrate early mental state attribution in a pragmatic context.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)907-912
Number of pages6
JournalDevelopmental Science
Volume13
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2010

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Aptitude
Communication
Gestures

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Cognitive Neuroscience

Cite this

Seventeen-month-olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret others' referential communication. / Southgate, Victoria; Chevallier, Coralie; Csibra, G.

In: Developmental Science, Vol. 13, No. 6, 11.2010, p. 907-912.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Southgate, Victoria ; Chevallier, Coralie ; Csibra, G. / Seventeen-month-olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret others' referential communication. In: Developmental Science. 2010 ; Vol. 13, No. 6. pp. 907-912.
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