Self-organization towards optimally interdependent networks by means of coevolution

Zhen Wang, A. Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

171 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Coevolution between strategy and network structure is established as a means to arrive at the optimal conditions needed to resolve social dilemmas. Yet recent research has highlighted that the interdependence between networks may be just as important as the structure of an individual network. We therefore introduce the coevolution of strategy and network interdependence to see whether this can give rise to elevated levels of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. We show that the interdependence between networks self-organizes so as to yield optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation. Even under extremely adverse conditions, cooperators can prevail where on isolated networks they would perish. This is due to the spontaneous emergence of a two-class society, with only the upper class being allowed to control and take advantage of the interdependence. Spatial patterns reveal that cooperators, once arriving at the upper class, are much more competent than defectors in sustaining compact clusters of followers. Indeed, the asymmetric exploitation of interdependence confers to them a strong evolutionary advantage that may resolve even the toughest of social dilemmas.

Original languageEnglish
Article number033041
JournalNew Journal of Physics
Volume16
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Fingerprint

sustaining
games
exploitation

Keywords

  • coevolution
  • cooperation
  • interdependent networks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Physics and Astronomy(all)

Cite this

Self-organization towards optimally interdependent networks by means of coevolution. / Wang, Zhen; Szolnoki, A.; Perc, Matjaž.

In: New Journal of Physics, Vol. 16, 033041, 2014.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{1477df8433454e0c819ae1793b7ceba8,
title = "Self-organization towards optimally interdependent networks by means of coevolution",
abstract = "Coevolution between strategy and network structure is established as a means to arrive at the optimal conditions needed to resolve social dilemmas. Yet recent research has highlighted that the interdependence between networks may be just as important as the structure of an individual network. We therefore introduce the coevolution of strategy and network interdependence to see whether this can give rise to elevated levels of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. We show that the interdependence between networks self-organizes so as to yield optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation. Even under extremely adverse conditions, cooperators can prevail where on isolated networks they would perish. This is due to the spontaneous emergence of a two-class society, with only the upper class being allowed to control and take advantage of the interdependence. Spatial patterns reveal that cooperators, once arriving at the upper class, are much more competent than defectors in sustaining compact clusters of followers. Indeed, the asymmetric exploitation of interdependence confers to them a strong evolutionary advantage that may resolve even the toughest of social dilemmas.",
keywords = "coevolution, cooperation, interdependent networks",
author = "Zhen Wang and A. Szolnoki and Matjaž Perc",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1088/1367-2630/16/3/033041",
language = "English",
volume = "16",
journal = "New Journal of Physics",
issn = "1367-2630",
publisher = "IOP Publishing Ltd.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Self-organization towards optimally interdependent networks by means of coevolution

AU - Wang, Zhen

AU - Szolnoki, A.

AU - Perc, Matjaž

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Coevolution between strategy and network structure is established as a means to arrive at the optimal conditions needed to resolve social dilemmas. Yet recent research has highlighted that the interdependence between networks may be just as important as the structure of an individual network. We therefore introduce the coevolution of strategy and network interdependence to see whether this can give rise to elevated levels of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. We show that the interdependence between networks self-organizes so as to yield optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation. Even under extremely adverse conditions, cooperators can prevail where on isolated networks they would perish. This is due to the spontaneous emergence of a two-class society, with only the upper class being allowed to control and take advantage of the interdependence. Spatial patterns reveal that cooperators, once arriving at the upper class, are much more competent than defectors in sustaining compact clusters of followers. Indeed, the asymmetric exploitation of interdependence confers to them a strong evolutionary advantage that may resolve even the toughest of social dilemmas.

AB - Coevolution between strategy and network structure is established as a means to arrive at the optimal conditions needed to resolve social dilemmas. Yet recent research has highlighted that the interdependence between networks may be just as important as the structure of an individual network. We therefore introduce the coevolution of strategy and network interdependence to see whether this can give rise to elevated levels of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. We show that the interdependence between networks self-organizes so as to yield optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation. Even under extremely adverse conditions, cooperators can prevail where on isolated networks they would perish. This is due to the spontaneous emergence of a two-class society, with only the upper class being allowed to control and take advantage of the interdependence. Spatial patterns reveal that cooperators, once arriving at the upper class, are much more competent than defectors in sustaining compact clusters of followers. Indeed, the asymmetric exploitation of interdependence confers to them a strong evolutionary advantage that may resolve even the toughest of social dilemmas.

KW - coevolution

KW - cooperation

KW - interdependent networks

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84897997302&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84897997302&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1088/1367-2630/16/3/033041

DO - 10.1088/1367-2630/16/3/033041

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84897997302

VL - 16

JO - New Journal of Physics

JF - New Journal of Physics

SN - 1367-2630

M1 - 033041

ER -