Selection of noise level in strategy adoption for spatial social dilemmas

A. Szolnoki, Jeromos Vukov, G. Szabó

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

90 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We studied spatial Prisoner's Dilemma and Stag Hunt games where both the strategy distribution and the players' individual noise level could evolve to reach higher individual payoff. Players are located on the sites of different two-dimensional lattices and gain their payoff from games with their neighbors by choosing unconditional cooperation or defection. The way of strategy adoption can be characterized by a single K (temperaturelike) parameter describing how strongly adoptions depend on the payoff difference. If we start the system from a random strategy distribution with many different player specific K parameters, the simultaneous evolution of strategies and K parameters drives the system to a final stationary state where only one K value remains. In the coexistence phase of cooperator and defector strategies the surviving K parameter is in good agreement with the noise level that ensures the highest cooperation level if uniform K is supposed for all players. In this paper we give a thorough overview about the properties of this evolutionary process.

Original languageEnglish
Article number056112
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume80
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 24 2009

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Social Dilemma
games
Game
Phase Coexistence
Prisoners' Dilemma
Stationary States
Strategy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability

Cite this

Selection of noise level in strategy adoption for spatial social dilemmas. / Szolnoki, A.; Vukov, Jeromos; Szabó, G.

In: Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics, Vol. 80, No. 5, 056112, 24.11.2009.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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