Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation

Matjaž Perc, A. Szolnoki, G. Szabó

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

110 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the evolution of cooperation within the spatial prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice where a fraction of players μ can spread their strategy more easily than the rest due to a predetermined larger teaching capability. In addition, players characterized by the larger teaching capability are allowed to temporarily link with distant opponents of the same kind with probability p, thus introducing shortcut connections among the distinguished players. We show that these additional temporary connections are able to sustain cooperation throughout the whole range of the temptation to defect. Remarkably, we observe that, as the temptation to defect increases the optimal μ decreases, and moreover only minute values of p warrant the best promotion of cooperation. Our study thus indicates that influential individuals must be few and sparsely connected in order for cooperation to thrive in a defection-prone environment.

Original languageEnglish
Article number066101
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume78
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2008

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Defects
Evolution of Cooperation
Prisoner's Dilemma Game
education
Square Lattice
defects
games
promotion
Decrease
Range of data
Teaching
Strategy
Promotion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability

Cite this

Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation. / Perc, Matjaž; Szolnoki, A.; Szabó, G.

In: Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics, Vol. 78, No. 6, 066101, 01.12.2008.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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