Reciprocity-based cooperative phalanx maintained by overconfident players

A. Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

According to the evolutionary game theory principle, a strategy representing a higher payoff can spread among competitors. But there are cases when a player consistently overestimates or underestimates her own payoff, which undermines proper comparison. Interestingly, both underconfident and overconfident individuals are capable of elevating the cooperation level significantly. While former players stimulate a local coordination of strategies, the presence of overconfident individuals enhances the spatial reciprocity mechanism. In both cases the propagations of competing strategies are influenced in a biased way resulting in a cooperation supporting environment. These effects are strongly related to the nonlinear character of invasion probabilities which is a common and frequently observed feature of microscopic dynamics.

Original languageEnglish
Article number022309
JournalPhysical Review E
Volume98
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 10 2018

Fingerprint

Reciprocity
game theory
Evolutionary Game Theory
Invasion
Biased
Propagation
propagation
Strategy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Condensed Matter Physics

Cite this

Reciprocity-based cooperative phalanx maintained by overconfident players. / Szolnoki, A.; Chen, Xiaojie.

In: Physical Review E, Vol. 98, No. 2, 022309, 10.08.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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