Quality of strong equilibria for selfish bin packing with uniform cost sharing

G. Dósa, Leah Epstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

The bin packing problem deals with packing items of sizes no larger than 1 into unit capacity bins. Here, we analyze a class of bin packing games where the cost of an item is 1 over the total number of items packed into its bin, which is a bin packing congestion game. We study strong equilibria and find the tight values of the SPoA and SPoS, that is, asymptotic approximation ratios of the worst and best strong equilibria. We show that these values are approximately 1.69103 and 1.611824, respectively. In particular, we observe that the two values are not equal, showing a difference from other known kinds of cost sharing approaches.

Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Scheduling
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2018

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Bins
Costs
Bin packing
Cost sharing
Strong equilibrium

Keywords

  • Bin packing
  • Price of anarchy
  • Strong equilibria

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Engineering(all)
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Quality of strong equilibria for selfish bin packing with uniform cost sharing. / Dósa, G.; Epstein, Leah.

In: Journal of Scheduling, 01.01.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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