Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game

Xiaojie Chen, A. Szolnoki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

24 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the tragedy of the common state, punishing the latter group seems to be an adequate reaction. This conclusion, however, is less straightforward when we acknowledge the fact that resources are finite and even a renewable resource has limited growing capacity. To clarify the possible consequences, we consider a coevolutionary model where beside the payoff-driven competition of cooperator and defector players the level of a renewable resource depends sensitively on the fraction of cooperators and the total consumption of all players. The applied feedback-evolving game reveals that beside a delicately adjusted punishment it is also fundamental that cooperators should pay special attention to the growing capacity of renewable resources. Otherwise, even the usage of tough punishment cannot save the community from an undesired end.

Original languageEnglish
Article numbere1006347
JournalPLoS Computational Biology
Volume14
Issue number7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 1 2018

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Renewable Resources
renewable resources
Punishment
renewable resource
Inspection
Game
Feedback
Resources
resource
Dilemma
inspection
Community
Model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Ecology
  • Molecular Biology
  • Genetics
  • Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics

Cite this

Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game. / Chen, Xiaojie; Szolnoki, A.

In: PLoS Computational Biology, Vol. 14, No. 7, e1006347, 01.07.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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