Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games

György Szabó, Christoph Hauert

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

308 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A spatial evolutionary public goods game (PGG) model demonstrating that the successful spreading of selfish behavior is efficiently prevented by allowing for voluntary participation is introduced. In the compulsory PGG, i.e., in the absence of loners, cooperators thrive only if clustering advantages are strong enough, which requires sufficiently high multiplication factors r. The introduction of loners leads to a cyclic dominance of the strategies and promotes substantial levels of cooperation where otherwise defectors dominate.

Original languageEnglish
Article number118101
Pages (from-to)118101/1-118101/4
JournalPhysical review letters
Volume89
Issue number11
Publication statusPublished - Sep 9 2002

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Physics and Astronomy(all)

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