Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games

G. Szabó, Christoph Hauert

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

105 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present a simple yet effective mechanism promoting cooperation under full anonymity by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. This natural extension leads to "rock-scissors-paper"-type cyclic dominance of the three strategies, cooperate, defect, and loner. In spatial settings with players arranged on a regular lattice, this results in interesting dynamical properties and intriguing spatiotemporal patterns. In particular, variations of the value of the public good leads to transitions between one-, two-, and three-strategy states which either are in the class of directed percolation or show interesting analogies to Ising-type models. Although volunteering is incapable of stabilizing cooperation, it efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish behavior.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)118101
Number of pages1
JournalPhysical Review Letters
Volume89
Issue number11
Publication statusPublished - Sep 9 2002

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Phase Transition
games
rocks
defects
Community Participation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Medicine(all)

Cite this

Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games. / Szabó, G.; Hauert, Christoph.

In: Physical Review Letters, Vol. 89, No. 11, 09.09.2002, p. 118101.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Szabó, G. ; Hauert, Christoph. / Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games. In: Physical Review Letters. 2002 ; Vol. 89, No. 11. pp. 118101.
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