Ordering in spatial evolutionary games for pairwise collective strategy updates

György Szabó, Attila Szolnoki, Melinda Varga, Lívia Hanusovszky

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23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Evolutionary 2×2 games are studied with players located on a square lattice. During the evolution the randomly chosen neighboring players try to maximize their collective income by adopting a random strategy pair with a probability dependent on the difference of their summed payoffs between the final and initial states assuming quenched strategies in their neighborhood. In the case of the anticoordination game this system behaves like an antiferromagnetic kinetic Ising model. Within a wide region of social dilemmas this dynamical rule supports the formation of similar spatial arrangement of the cooperators and defectors ensuring the optimum total payoff if the temptation to choose defection exceeds a threshold value dependent on the sucker's payoff. The comparison of the results with those achieved for pairwise imitation and myopic strategy updates has indicated the relevant advantage of pairwise collective strategy update in the maintenance of cooperation.

Original languageEnglish
Article number026110
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume82
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 19 2010

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Condensed Matter Physics

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