Motion of influential players can support cooperation in prisoner's dilemma

M. Droz, J. Szwabiński, G. Szabó

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

62 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor's strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategies; therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w <1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)579-585
Number of pages7
JournalEuropean Physical Journal B
Volume71
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2009

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Electronic, Optical and Magnetic Materials

Cite this

Motion of influential players can support cooperation in prisoner's dilemma. / Droz, M.; Szwabiński, J.; Szabó, G.

In: European Physical Journal B, Vol. 71, No. 4, 10.2009, p. 579-585.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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