Motion of influential players can support cooperation in prisoner's dilemma

M. Droz, J. Szwabiński, G. Szabó

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

64 Citations (Scopus)


We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor's strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategies; therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)579-585
Number of pages7
JournalEuropean Physical Journal B
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Oct 1 2009

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electronic, Optical and Magnetic Materials
  • Condensed Matter Physics

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