Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

A. Szolnoki, M. Perc, Z. Danku

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

175 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game is studied where initially all players are linked via a regular graph, having four neighbors each. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players are allowed to make new connections and thus permanently extend their neighborhoods, provided they have been successful in passing their strategy to the opponents. We show that this simple coevolutionary rule shifts the survival barrier of cooperators towards high temptations to defect and results in highly heterogeneous interaction networks with an exponential fit best characterizing their degree distributions. In particular, there exist an optimal maximal degree for the promotion of cooperation, warranting the best exchange of information between influential players.

Original languageEnglish
Article number50007
JournalEPL
Volume84
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008

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games
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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Physics and Astronomy(all)

Cite this

Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. / Szolnoki, A.; Perc, M.; Danku, Z.

In: EPL, Vol. 84, No. 5, 50007, 2008.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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