Inter-domain routing in multiprovider optical networks: Game theory and simulations

Krisztina Lója, János Szigeti, T. Cinkler

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Multiprovider inter-domain routing can be modeled using game theory, since the domains (or the domain operators) act as players trying to maximize their revenues. Each domain decides what intra-domain connection alternatives it advertises for inter-domain traffic and what the key attributes are of these intra-domain connections (allocation cost, latency, bandwidth or confidence level of availability). The advertised parameters affect the routing algorithm, the selected inter-domain path as well as the payoff of all the operators. As the broadband communication networks become optical, our model assumes a two layer network consisting of autonomous domains, where the optical cross-connects have limited wavelength conversion capability. In this paper we study the dependency of the domain income and the advertised cost of connection alternatives, assuming "cheapest-path" routing. We examined basic scenarios of inter-domain routing and determined Nash and Pareto equilibrium for different network load levels, where provider tariffs and end-user satisfaction were taken into account simultaneously. Beside analytical results, we ran simulations which met our expectations.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationNGI 2005 - Next Generation Internet Networks: Traffic Engineering
Pages157-164
Number of pages8
Volume2005
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2005
EventNext Generation Internet Networks, NGI 2005 - Roma, Italy
Duration: Apr 18 2005Apr 20 2005

Other

OtherNext Generation Internet Networks, NGI 2005
CountryItaly
CityRoma
Period4/18/054/20/05

Fingerprint

Game theory
Fiber optic networks
Optical frequency conversion
Broadband networks
Network layers
Routing algorithms
Telecommunication networks
Costs
Availability
Bandwidth

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

Lója, K., Szigeti, J., & Cinkler, T. (2005). Inter-domain routing in multiprovider optical networks: Game theory and simulations. In NGI 2005 - Next Generation Internet Networks: Traffic Engineering (Vol. 2005, pp. 157-164). [1431661] https://doi.org/10.1109/NGI.2005.1431661

Inter-domain routing in multiprovider optical networks : Game theory and simulations. / Lója, Krisztina; Szigeti, János; Cinkler, T.

NGI 2005 - Next Generation Internet Networks: Traffic Engineering. Vol. 2005 2005. p. 157-164 1431661.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Lója, K, Szigeti, J & Cinkler, T 2005, Inter-domain routing in multiprovider optical networks: Game theory and simulations. in NGI 2005 - Next Generation Internet Networks: Traffic Engineering. vol. 2005, 1431661, pp. 157-164, Next Generation Internet Networks, NGI 2005, Roma, Italy, 4/18/05. https://doi.org/10.1109/NGI.2005.1431661
Lója K, Szigeti J, Cinkler T. Inter-domain routing in multiprovider optical networks: Game theory and simulations. In NGI 2005 - Next Generation Internet Networks: Traffic Engineering. Vol. 2005. 2005. p. 157-164. 1431661 https://doi.org/10.1109/NGI.2005.1431661
Lója, Krisztina ; Szigeti, János ; Cinkler, T. / Inter-domain routing in multiprovider optical networks : Game theory and simulations. NGI 2005 - Next Generation Internet Networks: Traffic Engineering. Vol. 2005 2005. pp. 157-164
@inproceedings{d52d6433b43a4aa79e99e1ac4b1909f5,
title = "Inter-domain routing in multiprovider optical networks: Game theory and simulations",
abstract = "Multiprovider inter-domain routing can be modeled using game theory, since the domains (or the domain operators) act as players trying to maximize their revenues. Each domain decides what intra-domain connection alternatives it advertises for inter-domain traffic and what the key attributes are of these intra-domain connections (allocation cost, latency, bandwidth or confidence level of availability). The advertised parameters affect the routing algorithm, the selected inter-domain path as well as the payoff of all the operators. As the broadband communication networks become optical, our model assumes a two layer network consisting of autonomous domains, where the optical cross-connects have limited wavelength conversion capability. In this paper we study the dependency of the domain income and the advertised cost of connection alternatives, assuming {"}cheapest-path{"} routing. We examined basic scenarios of inter-domain routing and determined Nash and Pareto equilibrium for different network load levels, where provider tariffs and end-user satisfaction were taken into account simultaneously. Beside analytical results, we ran simulations which met our expectations.",
author = "Krisztina L{\'o}ja and J{\'a}nos Szigeti and T. Cinkler",
year = "2005",
doi = "10.1109/NGI.2005.1431661",
language = "English",
volume = "2005",
pages = "157--164",
booktitle = "NGI 2005 - Next Generation Internet Networks: Traffic Engineering",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Inter-domain routing in multiprovider optical networks

T2 - Game theory and simulations

AU - Lója, Krisztina

AU - Szigeti, János

AU - Cinkler, T.

PY - 2005

Y1 - 2005

N2 - Multiprovider inter-domain routing can be modeled using game theory, since the domains (or the domain operators) act as players trying to maximize their revenues. Each domain decides what intra-domain connection alternatives it advertises for inter-domain traffic and what the key attributes are of these intra-domain connections (allocation cost, latency, bandwidth or confidence level of availability). The advertised parameters affect the routing algorithm, the selected inter-domain path as well as the payoff of all the operators. As the broadband communication networks become optical, our model assumes a two layer network consisting of autonomous domains, where the optical cross-connects have limited wavelength conversion capability. In this paper we study the dependency of the domain income and the advertised cost of connection alternatives, assuming "cheapest-path" routing. We examined basic scenarios of inter-domain routing and determined Nash and Pareto equilibrium for different network load levels, where provider tariffs and end-user satisfaction were taken into account simultaneously. Beside analytical results, we ran simulations which met our expectations.

AB - Multiprovider inter-domain routing can be modeled using game theory, since the domains (or the domain operators) act as players trying to maximize their revenues. Each domain decides what intra-domain connection alternatives it advertises for inter-domain traffic and what the key attributes are of these intra-domain connections (allocation cost, latency, bandwidth or confidence level of availability). The advertised parameters affect the routing algorithm, the selected inter-domain path as well as the payoff of all the operators. As the broadband communication networks become optical, our model assumes a two layer network consisting of autonomous domains, where the optical cross-connects have limited wavelength conversion capability. In this paper we study the dependency of the domain income and the advertised cost of connection alternatives, assuming "cheapest-path" routing. We examined basic scenarios of inter-domain routing and determined Nash and Pareto equilibrium for different network load levels, where provider tariffs and end-user satisfaction were taken into account simultaneously. Beside analytical results, we ran simulations which met our expectations.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33744469372&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33744469372&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/NGI.2005.1431661

DO - 10.1109/NGI.2005.1431661

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:33744469372

VL - 2005

SP - 157

EP - 164

BT - NGI 2005 - Next Generation Internet Networks: Traffic Engineering

ER -