Impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

A. Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, G. Szabó, Hans Ulrich Stark

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

128 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Aging is always present, tailoring our interactions with others, and postulating a finite lifespan during which we are able to exercise them. We consider the prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice and examine how quenched age distributions and different aging protocols influence the evolution of cooperation when taking the life experience and knowledge accumulation into account as time passes. In agreement with previous studies, we find that a quenched assignment of age to players, introducing heterogeneity to the game, substantially promotes cooperative behavior. Introduction of aging and subsequent death as a coevolutionary process may act detrimental on cooperation but enhances it efficiently if the offspring of individuals that have successfully passed their strategy is considered newborn. We study resulting age distributions of players and show that the heterogeneity is vital-yet insufficient-for explaining the observed differences in cooperator abundance on the spatial grid. The unexpected increment of cooperation levels can be explained by a dynamical effect that has a highly selective impact on the propagation of cooperator and defector states.

Original languageEnglish
Article number021901
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume80
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 4 2009

Fingerprint

Evolution of Cooperation
Prisoner's Dilemma Game
games
Cooperative Behavior
Life Span
physical exercise
Square Lattice
death
Exercise
Increment
Assignment
grids
Game
Propagation
Grid
propagation
Interaction
interactions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability

Cite this

Impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. / Szolnoki, A.; Perc, Matjaž; Szabó, G.; Stark, Hans Ulrich.

In: Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics, Vol. 80, No. 2, 021901, 04.08.2009.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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