If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: Importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation

Zhen Wang, A. Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc

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131 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Spatial reciprocity is a well known tour de force of cooperation promotion. A thorough understanding of the effects of different population densities is therefore crucial. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas on different interaction graphs with a certain fraction of vacant nodes. We find that sparsity may favor the resolution of social dilemmas, especially if the population density is close to the percolation threshold of the underlying graph. Regardless of the type of the governing social dilemma as well as particularities of the interaction graph, we show that under pairwise imitation the percolation threshold is a universal indicator of how dense the occupancy ought to be for cooperation to be optimally promoted. We also demonstrate that myopic updating, due to the lack of efficient spread of information via imitation, renders the reported mechanism dysfunctional, which in turn further strengthens its foundations.

Original languageEnglish
Article numbersrep00369
JournalScientific Reports
Volume2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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Population Density

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If players are sparse social dilemmas are too : Importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation. / Wang, Zhen; Szolnoki, A.; Perc, Matjaž.

In: Scientific Reports, Vol. 2, srep00369, 2012.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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