Generalized Attack Protection in the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise Secure Key Exchanger

Gergely Vadai, Z. Gingl, Robert Mingesz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise unconditionally secure key exchanger is a promising, surprisingly simple, very low cost and efficient electronic alternative to quantum key distribution. A few resistors, switches, and interconnecting cables can provide unconditionally secure data transmission in the ideal case by utilizing the thermal noise of the resistors. The key problems regarding practical realizations are related to the resistance tolerance, finite cable resistance, and other non-ideal properties that can cause information leak. In this paper, we present robust protection from cable resistance and resistance mismatch attacks against the system. Our theoretical results show that all resistive inaccuracies, parasitic resistances, cable resistance, and temperature dependence can be compensated; therefore, the practical implementation becomes much easier. The generalized method provides inherent protection against the so-called second law attack as well.

Original languageEnglish
Article number7437387
Pages (from-to)1141-1147
Number of pages7
JournalIEEE Access
Volume4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

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Keywords

  • attack protection
  • KLJN secure key exchanger
  • secure key exchange
  • unconditional security

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Engineering(all)
  • Materials Science(all)

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