### Abstract

In this paper, we study the robustness of networks that are characterized by many-to-one communications (e.g., access networks and sensor networks) in a game-theoretic model. More specifically, we model the interactions between a network operator and an adversary as a two player zero-sum game, where the network operator chooses a spanning tree in the network, the adversary chooses an edge to be removed from the network, and the adversary's payoff is proportional to the number of nodes that can no longer reach a designated node through the spanning tree. We show that the payoff in every Nash equilibrium of the game is equal to the reciprocal of the persistence of the network. We describe optimal adversarial and operator strategies and give efficient, polynomial-time algorithms to compute optimal strategies. We also generalize our game model to include varying node weights, as well as attacks against nodes.

Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering |

Pages | 88-98 |

Number of pages | 11 |

Volume | 105 LNICST |

DOIs | |

Publication status | Published - 2012 |

Event | 3rd International ICST Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2012 - Vancouver, BC, Canada Duration: May 24 2012 → May 26 2012 |

### Publication series

Name | Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering |
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Volume | 105 LNICST |

ISSN (Print) | 18678211 |

### Other

Other | 3rd International ICST Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2012 |
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Country | Canada |

City | Vancouver, BC |

Period | 5/24/12 → 5/26/12 |

### Fingerprint

### Keywords

- access networks
- adversarial games
- directed graph strength
- game theory
- graph persistence
- network robustness
- sensor networks

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Computer Networks and Communications

### Cite this

*Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering*(Vol. 105 LNICST, pp. 88-98). (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 105 LNICST). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_7

**Game-theoretic robustness of many-to-one networks.** / Laszka, Aron; Szeszlér, Dávid; Buttyán, L.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

*Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering.*vol. 105 LNICST, Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 105 LNICST, pp. 88-98, 3rd International ICST Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2012, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 5/24/12. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_7

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Game-theoretic robustness of many-to-one networks

AU - Laszka, Aron

AU - Szeszlér, Dávid

AU - Buttyán, L.

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - In this paper, we study the robustness of networks that are characterized by many-to-one communications (e.g., access networks and sensor networks) in a game-theoretic model. More specifically, we model the interactions between a network operator and an adversary as a two player zero-sum game, where the network operator chooses a spanning tree in the network, the adversary chooses an edge to be removed from the network, and the adversary's payoff is proportional to the number of nodes that can no longer reach a designated node through the spanning tree. We show that the payoff in every Nash equilibrium of the game is equal to the reciprocal of the persistence of the network. We describe optimal adversarial and operator strategies and give efficient, polynomial-time algorithms to compute optimal strategies. We also generalize our game model to include varying node weights, as well as attacks against nodes.

AB - In this paper, we study the robustness of networks that are characterized by many-to-one communications (e.g., access networks and sensor networks) in a game-theoretic model. More specifically, we model the interactions between a network operator and an adversary as a two player zero-sum game, where the network operator chooses a spanning tree in the network, the adversary chooses an edge to be removed from the network, and the adversary's payoff is proportional to the number of nodes that can no longer reach a designated node through the spanning tree. We show that the payoff in every Nash equilibrium of the game is equal to the reciprocal of the persistence of the network. We describe optimal adversarial and operator strategies and give efficient, polynomial-time algorithms to compute optimal strategies. We also generalize our game model to include varying node weights, as well as attacks against nodes.

KW - access networks

KW - adversarial games

KW - directed graph strength

KW - game theory

KW - graph persistence

KW - network robustness

KW - sensor networks

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84873970224&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84873970224&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_7

DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_7

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 9783642355813

VL - 105 LNICST

T3 - Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

SP - 88

EP - 98

BT - Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

ER -