Game-theoretic robustness of many-to-one networks

Aron Laszka, Dávid Szeszlér, L. Buttyán

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we study the robustness of networks that are characterized by many-to-one communications (e.g., access networks and sensor networks) in a game-theoretic model. More specifically, we model the interactions between a network operator and an adversary as a two player zero-sum game, where the network operator chooses a spanning tree in the network, the adversary chooses an edge to be removed from the network, and the adversary's payoff is proportional to the number of nodes that can no longer reach a designated node through the spanning tree. We show that the payoff in every Nash equilibrium of the game is equal to the reciprocal of the persistence of the network. We describe optimal adversarial and operator strategies and give efficient, polynomial-time algorithms to compute optimal strategies. We also generalize our game model to include varying node weights, as well as attacks against nodes.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Pages88-98
Number of pages11
Volume105 LNICST
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Event3rd International ICST Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2012 - Vancouver, BC, Canada
Duration: May 24 2012May 26 2012

Publication series

NameLecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Volume105 LNICST
ISSN (Print)18678211

Other

Other3rd International ICST Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2012
CountryCanada
CityVancouver, BC
Period5/24/125/26/12

Fingerprint

Sensor networks
Mathematical operators
Polynomials
Communication

Keywords

  • access networks
  • adversarial games
  • directed graph strength
  • game theory
  • graph persistence
  • network robustness
  • sensor networks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Laszka, A., Szeszlér, D., & Buttyán, L. (2012). Game-theoretic robustness of many-to-one networks. In Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (Vol. 105 LNICST, pp. 88-98). (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 105 LNICST). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_7

Game-theoretic robustness of many-to-one networks. / Laszka, Aron; Szeszlér, Dávid; Buttyán, L.

Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering. Vol. 105 LNICST 2012. p. 88-98 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 105 LNICST).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Laszka, A, Szeszlér, D & Buttyán, L 2012, Game-theoretic robustness of many-to-one networks. in Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering. vol. 105 LNICST, Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 105 LNICST, pp. 88-98, 3rd International ICST Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2012, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 5/24/12. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_7
Laszka A, Szeszlér D, Buttyán L. Game-theoretic robustness of many-to-one networks. In Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering. Vol. 105 LNICST. 2012. p. 88-98. (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_7
Laszka, Aron ; Szeszlér, Dávid ; Buttyán, L. / Game-theoretic robustness of many-to-one networks. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering. Vol. 105 LNICST 2012. pp. 88-98 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering).
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