Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation

G. Szabó, Christoph Hauert

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

174 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Voluntary participation in public good games has recently been demonstrated to be a simple yet effective mechanism to avoid deadlocks in states of mutual defection and to promote persistent cooperative behavior. Apart from cooperators and defectors a third strategical type is considered: the risk averse loners who are unwilling to participate in the social enterprise and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This results in a rock-scissors-paper type of cyclic dominance of the three strategies. In the prisoner's dilemma, the effects of voluntary participation crucially depend on the underlying population structure. While leading to homogeneous states of all loners in well-mixed populations, we demonstrate that cyclic dominance produces self-organizing patterns on square lattices but leads to different types of oscillatory behavior on random regular graphs: the temptation to defect determines whether damped, periodic, or increasing oscillations occur. These Monte Carlo simulations are complemented by predictions from pair approximation reproducing the results for random regular graphs particularly well.

Original languageEnglish
Article number062903
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume66
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2002

Fingerprint

Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Evolutionary Game
games
Regular Graph
Random Graphs
Pair Approximation
Population Structure
Cooperative Behavior
Prisoners' Dilemma
organizing
Deadlock
Self-organizing
Square Lattice
Damped
Monte Carlo Simulation
Defects
rocks
Oscillation
Game
oscillations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Physics and Astronomy(all)
  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Mathematical Physics

Cite this

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation. / Szabó, G.; Hauert, Christoph.

In: Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics, Vol. 66, No. 6, 062903, 12.2002.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{1cb607ff78df4de58dfaabd7a9a8c1e6,
title = "Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation",
abstract = "Voluntary participation in public good games has recently been demonstrated to be a simple yet effective mechanism to avoid deadlocks in states of mutual defection and to promote persistent cooperative behavior. Apart from cooperators and defectors a third strategical type is considered: the risk averse loners who are unwilling to participate in the social enterprise and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This results in a rock-scissors-paper type of cyclic dominance of the three strategies. In the prisoner's dilemma, the effects of voluntary participation crucially depend on the underlying population structure. While leading to homogeneous states of all loners in well-mixed populations, we demonstrate that cyclic dominance produces self-organizing patterns on square lattices but leads to different types of oscillatory behavior on random regular graphs: the temptation to defect determines whether damped, periodic, or increasing oscillations occur. These Monte Carlo simulations are complemented by predictions from pair approximation reproducing the results for random regular graphs particularly well.",
author = "G. Szab{\'o} and Christoph Hauert",
year = "2002",
month = "12",
doi = "10.1103/PhysRevE.66.062903",
language = "English",
volume = "66",
journal = "Physical review. E",
issn = "2470-0045",
publisher = "American Physical Society",
number = "6",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation

AU - Szabó, G.

AU - Hauert, Christoph

PY - 2002/12

Y1 - 2002/12

N2 - Voluntary participation in public good games has recently been demonstrated to be a simple yet effective mechanism to avoid deadlocks in states of mutual defection and to promote persistent cooperative behavior. Apart from cooperators and defectors a third strategical type is considered: the risk averse loners who are unwilling to participate in the social enterprise and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This results in a rock-scissors-paper type of cyclic dominance of the three strategies. In the prisoner's dilemma, the effects of voluntary participation crucially depend on the underlying population structure. While leading to homogeneous states of all loners in well-mixed populations, we demonstrate that cyclic dominance produces self-organizing patterns on square lattices but leads to different types of oscillatory behavior on random regular graphs: the temptation to defect determines whether damped, periodic, or increasing oscillations occur. These Monte Carlo simulations are complemented by predictions from pair approximation reproducing the results for random regular graphs particularly well.

AB - Voluntary participation in public good games has recently been demonstrated to be a simple yet effective mechanism to avoid deadlocks in states of mutual defection and to promote persistent cooperative behavior. Apart from cooperators and defectors a third strategical type is considered: the risk averse loners who are unwilling to participate in the social enterprise and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This results in a rock-scissors-paper type of cyclic dominance of the three strategies. In the prisoner's dilemma, the effects of voluntary participation crucially depend on the underlying population structure. While leading to homogeneous states of all loners in well-mixed populations, we demonstrate that cyclic dominance produces self-organizing patterns on square lattices but leads to different types of oscillatory behavior on random regular graphs: the temptation to defect determines whether damped, periodic, or increasing oscillations occur. These Monte Carlo simulations are complemented by predictions from pair approximation reproducing the results for random regular graphs particularly well.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=37649032642&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=37649032642&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1103/PhysRevE.66.062903

DO - 10.1103/PhysRevE.66.062903

M3 - Article

VL - 66

JO - Physical review. E

JF - Physical review. E

SN - 2470-0045

IS - 6

M1 - 062903

ER -