Evolutionary matching-pennies game on bipartite regular networks

G. Szabó, Levente Varga, István Borsos

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Evolutionary games are studied here with two types of players located on a chessboard or on a bipartite random regular graph. Each player's income comes from matching-pennies games played with the four neighbors. The players can modify their own strategies according to a myopic strategy update resembling the Glauber dynamics for the kinetic Ising model. This dynamical rule drives the system into a stationary state where the two strategies are present with the same probability without correlations between the nearest neighbors while a weak correlation is induced between the second and the third neighbors. In stationary states, the deviation from the detailed balance is quantified by the evaluation of entropy production. Finally, our analysis is extended to evolutionary games where the uniform pair interactions are composed of an anticoordination game and a weak matching-pennies game. This system preserves the Ising type order-disorder transitions at a critical noise level decreasing with the strength of the matching-pennies component for both networks.

Original languageEnglish
Article number042820
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume89
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 30 2014

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games
Entropy
Noise
Evolutionary Game
Game
Stationary States
Kinetic Ising Model
Glauber Dynamics
Order Type
Detailed Balance
Entropy Production
Regular Graph
Random Graphs
Ising
Disorder
Nearest Neighbor
income
Deviation
Update
Ising model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Medicine(all)

Cite this

Evolutionary matching-pennies game on bipartite regular networks. / Szabó, G.; Varga, Levente; Borsos, István.

In: Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics, Vol. 89, No. 4, 042820, 30.04.2014.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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