Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Evolution of cooperative norms is studied in a population where individual- and group-level selection are both in operation. Individuals play indirect reciprocity game within their group. Individuals are well informed about the previous actions and reputations, and follow second-order norms. Individuals are norm-followers, and imitate their successful group mates. In contrast to previous models where norms classify actions deterministically, we assume that norms determine only the probabilities of actions, and mutants can differ in these probabilities. The central question is how a selective cooperative norm can emerge in a population where initially only non-cooperative norms were present. It is shown that evolution leads to a cooperative state if generous cooperative strategies are dominant, although the "always defecting" and the "always cooperating"-like strategies remain stably present. The characteristics of these generous cooperative strategies and the presence of always defecting and always cooperating strategies are in concordance with experimental observations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)397-407
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Theoretical Biology
Volume257
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 7 2009

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cooperatives
Norm
Population
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Reciprocity
Mutant
mutants
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Strategy

Keywords

  • Group selection
  • Human cooperation
  • Indirect altruism
  • Second-order information
  • Social norm

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Medicine(all)
  • Immunology and Microbiology(all)
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection. / Scheuring, I.

In: Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 257, No. 3, 07.04.2009, p. 397-407.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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