Evolution of extortion in structured populations

A. Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

84 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. But if players are able to adopt the strategies performing better, extortion becomes widespread and evolutionary unstable. It may sometimes act as a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, and it can also emerge in interactions between two populations, yet it is not the evolutionarily stable outcome. Here we revisit these results in the realm of spatial games. We find that pairwise imitation and birth-death dynamics return known evolutionary outcomes. Myopic best response strategy updating, on the other hand, reveals counterintuitive solutions. Defectors and extortioners coarsen spontaneously, which allows cooperators to prevail even at prohibitively high temptations to defect. Here extortion strategies play the role of a Trojan horse. They may emerge among defectors by chance, and once they do, cooperators become viable as well. These results are independent of the interaction topology, and they highlight the importance of coarsening, checkerboard ordering, and best response updating in evolutionary games.

Original languageEnglish
Article number022804
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume89
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 14 2014

Fingerprint

Structured Populations
games
Parturition
Population
Updating
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Evolution of Cooperation
Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Evolutionary Game
Imitation
Coarsening
Catalyst
Interaction
death
Pairwise
topology
Defects
Unstable
interactions
Game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Medicine(all)

Cite this

Evolution of extortion in structured populations. / Szolnoki, A.; Perc, Matjaž.

In: Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics, Vol. 89, No. 2, 022804, 14.02.2014.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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