Evolution of emotions on networks leads to the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas

A. Szolnoki, Neng Gang Xie, Ye Ye, Matjaž Perc

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

48 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that the resolution of social dilemmas in random graphs and scale-free networks is facilitated by imitating not the strategy of better-performing players but, rather, their emotions. We assume sympathy and envy to be the two emotions that determine the strategy of each player in any given interaction, and we define them as the probabilities of cooperating with players having a lower and a higher payoff, respectively. Starting with a population where all possible combinations of the two emotions are available, the evolutionary process leads to a spontaneous fixation to a single emotional profile that is eventually adopted by all players. However, this emotional profile depends not only on the payoffs but also on the heterogeneity of the interaction network. Homogeneous networks, such as lattices and regular random graphs, lead to fixations that are characterized by high sympathy and high envy, while heterogeneous networks lead to low or modest sympathy but also low envy. Our results thus suggest that public emotions and the propensity to cooperate at large depend, and are in fact determined by, the properties of the interaction network.

Original languageEnglish
Article number042805
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume87
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 4 2013

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Social Dilemma
emotions
Evolution of Cooperation
Emotions
Fixation
Random Graphs
Interaction
interactions
profiles
Heterogeneous Networks
Scale-free Networks
Regular Graph
Emotion
Population

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Medicine(all)

Cite this

Evolution of emotions on networks leads to the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. / Szolnoki, A.; Xie, Neng Gang; Ye, Ye; Perc, Matjaž.

In: Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics, Vol. 87, No. 4, 042805, 04.04.2013.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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