In multi-hop wireless networks, every node is expected to forward packets for the benefit of other nodes. Yet, if each node is its own authority, then it may selfishly deny packet forwarding in order to save its own resources. Some researchers have proposed to introduce an incentive mechanism in the network that motivates the nodes to cooperate. In this paper, we address the question of whether such an incentive mechanism is necessary or cooperation between the nodes exists in the absence of it. We define a model in a game theoretic framework and identify the conditions under which cooperative strategies can form an equilibrium. As the problem is somewhat involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration.
|Number of pages||14|
|Journal||Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)|
|Publication status||Published - 2003|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Computer Science(all)