Equilibrium analysis of packet forwarding strategies in wireless ad hoc networks - The static case

M. Félegyházi, L. Buttyán, J. P. Hubaux

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In multi-hop wireless networks, every node is expected to forward packets for the benefit of other nodes. Yet, if each node is its own authority, then it may selfishly deny packet forwarding in order to save its own resources. Some researchers have proposed to introduce an incentive mechanism in the network that motivates the nodes to cooperate. In this paper, we address the question of whether such an incentive mechanism is necessary or cooperation between the nodes exists in the absence of it. We define a model in a game theoretic framework and identify the conditions under which cooperative strategies can form an equilibrium. As the problem is somewhat involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)776-789
Number of pages14
JournalLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume2775
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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