Dynamically generated cyclic dominance in spatial prisoner's dilemma games

A. Szolnoki, Zhen Wang, Jinlong Wang, Xiaodan Zhu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

49 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We have studied the impact of time-dependent learning capacities of players in the framework of spatial prisoner's dilemma game. In our model, this capacity of players may decrease or increase in time after strategy adoption according to a steplike function. We investigated both possibilities separately and observed significantly different mechanisms that form the stationary pattern of the system. The time decreasing learning activity helps cooperator domains to recover the possible intrude of defectors hence supports cooperation. In the other case the temporary restrained learning activity generates a cyclic dominance between defector and cooperator strategies, which helps to maintain the diversity of strategies via propagating waves. The results are robust and remain valid by changing payoff values, interaction graphs or functions characterizing time dependence of learning activity. Our observations suggest that dynamically generated mechanisms may offer alternative ways to keep cooperators alive even at very larger temptation to defect.

Original languageEnglish
Article number036110
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume82
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 20 2010

Fingerprint

Prisoner's Dilemma Game
games
learning
Time Dependence
time dependence
Defects
Valid
Decrease
Learning
Alternatives
defects
Graph in graph theory
Interaction
Strategy
interactions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability

Cite this

Dynamically generated cyclic dominance in spatial prisoner's dilemma games. / Szolnoki, A.; Wang, Zhen; Wang, Jinlong; Zhu, Xiaodan.

In: Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics, Vol. 82, No. 3, 036110, 20.09.2010.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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