Dynamic-sensitive cooperation in the presence of multiple strategy updating rules

A. Szolnoki, Zsuzsa Danku

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The importance of microscopic details on cooperation level is an intensively studied aspect of evolutionary game theory. Interestingly, these details become crucial on heterogeneous populations where individuals may possess diverse traits. By introducing a coevolutionary model in which not only strategies but also individual dynamical features may evolve we revealed that the formerly established conclusion is not necessarily true when different updating rules are on stage. In particular, we apply two strategy updating rules, imitation and Death–Birth rule, which allow local selection in a spatial system. Our observation highlights that the microscopic feature of dynamics, like the level of learning activity, could be a fundamental factor even if all players share the same trait uniformly.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)371-377
Number of pages7
JournalPhysica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
Volume511
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2018

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Updating
game theory
Evolutionary Game Theory
Imitation
learning
Strategy
Model
Learning
Observation

Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Death–birth rule
  • Imitation
  • Social dilemma

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Condensed Matter Physics

Cite this

Dynamic-sensitive cooperation in the presence of multiple strategy updating rules. / Szolnoki, A.; Danku, Zsuzsa.

In: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Vol. 511, 01.12.2018, p. 371-377.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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