Different perceptions of social dilemmas: Evolutionary multigames in structured populations

Zhen Wang, A. Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

45 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the population adopts either a positive or a negative value of the sucker's payoff, thus playing either the traditional prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game. We show that the higher the fraction of the population adopting a different payoff matrix the more the evolution of cooperation is promoted. The microscopic mechanism responsible for this outcome is unique to structured populations, and it is due to the payoff heterogeneity, which spontaneously introduces strong cooperative leaders that give rise to an asymmetric strategy imitation flow in favor of cooperation. We demonstrate that the reported evolutionary outcomes are robust against variations of the interaction network, and they also remain valid if players are allowed to vary which game they play over time. These results corroborate existing evidence in favor of heterogeneity-enhanced network reciprocity, and they reveal how different perceptions of social dilemmas may contribute to their resolution.

Original languageEnglish
Article number032813
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume90
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 23 2014

Fingerprint

Social Dilemma
Social Perception
Structured Populations
Prisoners' Dilemma
games
Game
Population
Evolution of Cooperation
Imitation
Reciprocity
Vary
Valid
Interaction
Demonstrate
matrices
interactions
Prisoner Dilemma

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Medicine(all)

Cite this

Different perceptions of social dilemmas : Evolutionary multigames in structured populations. / Wang, Zhen; Szolnoki, A.; Perc, Matjaž.

In: Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics, Vol. 90, No. 3, 032813, 23.09.2014.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{82f35ecdac3f44c895dfda36d8924ea4,
title = "Different perceptions of social dilemmas: Evolutionary multigames in structured populations",
abstract = "Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the population adopts either a positive or a negative value of the sucker's payoff, thus playing either the traditional prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game. We show that the higher the fraction of the population adopting a different payoff matrix the more the evolution of cooperation is promoted. The microscopic mechanism responsible for this outcome is unique to structured populations, and it is due to the payoff heterogeneity, which spontaneously introduces strong cooperative leaders that give rise to an asymmetric strategy imitation flow in favor of cooperation. We demonstrate that the reported evolutionary outcomes are robust against variations of the interaction network, and they also remain valid if players are allowed to vary which game they play over time. These results corroborate existing evidence in favor of heterogeneity-enhanced network reciprocity, and they reveal how different perceptions of social dilemmas may contribute to their resolution.",
author = "Zhen Wang and A. Szolnoki and Matjaž Perc",
year = "2014",
month = "9",
day = "23",
doi = "10.1103/PhysRevE.90.032813",
language = "English",
volume = "90",
journal = "Physical review. E",
issn = "2470-0045",
publisher = "American Physical Society",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Different perceptions of social dilemmas

T2 - Evolutionary multigames in structured populations

AU - Wang, Zhen

AU - Szolnoki, A.

AU - Perc, Matjaž

PY - 2014/9/23

Y1 - 2014/9/23

N2 - Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the population adopts either a positive or a negative value of the sucker's payoff, thus playing either the traditional prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game. We show that the higher the fraction of the population adopting a different payoff matrix the more the evolution of cooperation is promoted. The microscopic mechanism responsible for this outcome is unique to structured populations, and it is due to the payoff heterogeneity, which spontaneously introduces strong cooperative leaders that give rise to an asymmetric strategy imitation flow in favor of cooperation. We demonstrate that the reported evolutionary outcomes are robust against variations of the interaction network, and they also remain valid if players are allowed to vary which game they play over time. These results corroborate existing evidence in favor of heterogeneity-enhanced network reciprocity, and they reveal how different perceptions of social dilemmas may contribute to their resolution.

AB - Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the population adopts either a positive or a negative value of the sucker's payoff, thus playing either the traditional prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game. We show that the higher the fraction of the population adopting a different payoff matrix the more the evolution of cooperation is promoted. The microscopic mechanism responsible for this outcome is unique to structured populations, and it is due to the payoff heterogeneity, which spontaneously introduces strong cooperative leaders that give rise to an asymmetric strategy imitation flow in favor of cooperation. We demonstrate that the reported evolutionary outcomes are robust against variations of the interaction network, and they also remain valid if players are allowed to vary which game they play over time. These results corroborate existing evidence in favor of heterogeneity-enhanced network reciprocity, and they reveal how different perceptions of social dilemmas may contribute to their resolution.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84907279794&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84907279794&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1103/PhysRevE.90.032813

DO - 10.1103/PhysRevE.90.032813

M3 - Article

C2 - 25314488

AN - SCOPUS:84907279794

VL - 90

JO - Physical review. E

JF - Physical review. E

SN - 2470-0045

IS - 3

M1 - 032813

ER -