Competition and partnership between conformity and payoff-based imitations in social dilemmas

A. Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Learning from a partner who collects a higher payoff is a frequently used working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal player prefers to follow the strategy choice of the majority in the local neighborhood, which is often called a conformity-driven strategy update. In this work we assume that both strategy learning methods are present and compete for space within the framework of a coevolutionary model. Our results reveal that the presence of a payoff-driven strategy learning method becomes exclusive for high sucker's payoff and/or high temptation values that represent a snowdrift game dilemma situation. In general, however, the competition of the mentioned strategy learning methods could be useful to enlarge the parameter space where only cooperators prevail. The success of cooperation is based on the enforced coordination of cooperator players which reveals the benefit of the latter strategy. Interestingly, the payoff-based and the conformity-based cooperator players can form an effective alliance against defectors that can also extend the parameter space of full cooperator solution in the stag-hunt game region. Our work highlights that the coevolution of strategies and individual features such as the learning method can provide a novel type of pattern formation mechanism that cannot be observed in a static model, and hence remains hidden in traditional models.

Original languageEnglish
Article number093008
JournalNew Journal of Physics
Volume20
Issue number9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 1 2018

Fingerprint

learning
games
game theory
static models

Keywords

  • coevolution
  • cooperation
  • social dilemmas

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Physics and Astronomy(all)

Cite this

Competition and partnership between conformity and payoff-based imitations in social dilemmas. / Szolnoki, A.; Chen, Xiaojie.

In: New Journal of Physics, Vol. 20, No. 9, 093008, 01.09.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{6e0652aafee24cbf9786707b74bd7ed7,
title = "Competition and partnership between conformity and payoff-based imitations in social dilemmas",
abstract = "Learning from a partner who collects a higher payoff is a frequently used working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal player prefers to follow the strategy choice of the majority in the local neighborhood, which is often called a conformity-driven strategy update. In this work we assume that both strategy learning methods are present and compete for space within the framework of a coevolutionary model. Our results reveal that the presence of a payoff-driven strategy learning method becomes exclusive for high sucker's payoff and/or high temptation values that represent a snowdrift game dilemma situation. In general, however, the competition of the mentioned strategy learning methods could be useful to enlarge the parameter space where only cooperators prevail. The success of cooperation is based on the enforced coordination of cooperator players which reveals the benefit of the latter strategy. Interestingly, the payoff-based and the conformity-based cooperator players can form an effective alliance against defectors that can also extend the parameter space of full cooperator solution in the stag-hunt game region. Our work highlights that the coevolution of strategies and individual features such as the learning method can provide a novel type of pattern formation mechanism that cannot be observed in a static model, and hence remains hidden in traditional models.",
keywords = "coevolution, cooperation, social dilemmas",
author = "A. Szolnoki and Xiaojie Chen",
year = "2018",
month = "9",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1088/1367-2630/aade3c",
language = "English",
volume = "20",
journal = "New Journal of Physics",
issn = "1367-2630",
publisher = "IOP Publishing Ltd.",
number = "9",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Competition and partnership between conformity and payoff-based imitations in social dilemmas

AU - Szolnoki, A.

AU - Chen, Xiaojie

PY - 2018/9/1

Y1 - 2018/9/1

N2 - Learning from a partner who collects a higher payoff is a frequently used working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal player prefers to follow the strategy choice of the majority in the local neighborhood, which is often called a conformity-driven strategy update. In this work we assume that both strategy learning methods are present and compete for space within the framework of a coevolutionary model. Our results reveal that the presence of a payoff-driven strategy learning method becomes exclusive for high sucker's payoff and/or high temptation values that represent a snowdrift game dilemma situation. In general, however, the competition of the mentioned strategy learning methods could be useful to enlarge the parameter space where only cooperators prevail. The success of cooperation is based on the enforced coordination of cooperator players which reveals the benefit of the latter strategy. Interestingly, the payoff-based and the conformity-based cooperator players can form an effective alliance against defectors that can also extend the parameter space of full cooperator solution in the stag-hunt game region. Our work highlights that the coevolution of strategies and individual features such as the learning method can provide a novel type of pattern formation mechanism that cannot be observed in a static model, and hence remains hidden in traditional models.

AB - Learning from a partner who collects a higher payoff is a frequently used working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal player prefers to follow the strategy choice of the majority in the local neighborhood, which is often called a conformity-driven strategy update. In this work we assume that both strategy learning methods are present and compete for space within the framework of a coevolutionary model. Our results reveal that the presence of a payoff-driven strategy learning method becomes exclusive for high sucker's payoff and/or high temptation values that represent a snowdrift game dilemma situation. In general, however, the competition of the mentioned strategy learning methods could be useful to enlarge the parameter space where only cooperators prevail. The success of cooperation is based on the enforced coordination of cooperator players which reveals the benefit of the latter strategy. Interestingly, the payoff-based and the conformity-based cooperator players can form an effective alliance against defectors that can also extend the parameter space of full cooperator solution in the stag-hunt game region. Our work highlights that the coevolution of strategies and individual features such as the learning method can provide a novel type of pattern formation mechanism that cannot be observed in a static model, and hence remains hidden in traditional models.

KW - coevolution

KW - cooperation

KW - social dilemmas

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85054286887&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85054286887&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1088/1367-2630/aade3c

DO - 10.1088/1367-2630/aade3c

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85054286887

VL - 20

JO - New Journal of Physics

JF - New Journal of Physics

SN - 1367-2630

IS - 9

M1 - 093008

ER -