Coexistence of cooperation and defection in public goods games

Marco Archetti, I. Scheuring

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

105 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The production of public goods by the contribution of individual volunteers is a social dilemma because an individual that does not volunteer can benefit from the public good produced by the contributions of others. Therefore it is generally believed that public goods can be produced only in the presence of repeated interactions (which allow reciprocation, reputation effects and punishment) or relatedness (kin selection). Cooperation, however, often occurs in the absence of iterations and relatedness. We show that when the production of a public good is a Volunteer's Dilemma, in which a fixed number of cooperators is necessary to produce the public good, cooperators and defectors persist in a mixed equilibrium, without iterations and without relatedness. This mixed equilibrium is absent in the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the public good is a linear function of the individual contributions. We also show that the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Volunteer's Dilemma are the two opposite extremes of a general public goods game, and that all intermediate cases can have a mixed equilibrium like the Volunteer's Dilemma. The coexistence of cooperators and defectors, therefore, is a typical outcome of most social dilemmas, which requires neither relatedness nor iterations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1140-1148
Number of pages9
JournalEvolution
Volume65
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2011

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coexistence
volunteers
Volunteers
prison inmates
relatedness
prisoner dilemma
kin selection
Punishment
co-operation
Prisoner Dilemma

Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Game theory
  • Mixed equilibrium
  • Prisoner's dilemma
  • Public good
  • Volunteer's dilemma

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
  • Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics
  • Genetics

Cite this

Coexistence of cooperation and defection in public goods games. / Archetti, Marco; Scheuring, I.

In: Evolution, Vol. 65, No. 4, 04.2011, p. 1140-1148.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Archetti, Marco ; Scheuring, I. / Coexistence of cooperation and defection in public goods games. In: Evolution. 2011 ; Vol. 65, No. 4. pp. 1140-1148.
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