Coevolutionary games-A mini review

Matjaž Perc, A. Szolnoki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1139 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges faced by cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory provides a competent theoretical framework for addressing the subtleties of cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent advances point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered by cooperative behavior. Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been recognized as potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend the potentials of such entities further, and even more importantly, lead to the understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to evolutionary games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as well. Coevolutionary rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of players, their reputation, mobility or age. Here we review recent works on evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as give a didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with the subject. In addition, we briefly outline directions for future research that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely open to research and thus hold promise of exciting new discoveries.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)109-125
Number of pages17
JournalBioSystems
Volume99
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2010

Fingerprint

Game Theory
Genetic Selection
Game theory
Cooperative Behavior
Reproduction
Game
Evolutionary Game
Research
Social Dilemma
Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolution of Cooperation
Spatial Heterogeneity
Misconceptions
Natural Selection
Spatial Structure
Promoter
Fitness
Direction compound
Review
Imply

Keywords

  • Coevolution
  • Cooperation
  • Evolutionary games
  • Social dilemmas

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Statistics and Probability

Cite this

Coevolutionary games-A mini review. / Perc, Matjaž; Szolnoki, A.

In: BioSystems, Vol. 99, No. 2, 02.2010, p. 109-125.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Perc, Matjaž ; Szolnoki, A. / Coevolutionary games-A mini review. In: BioSystems. 2010 ; Vol. 99, No. 2. pp. 109-125.
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