Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation

A. Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

233 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is determined by the payoff difference and a teaching activity characterizing the donor's capability to enforce its strategy on the opponent. Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied by an increase in the donor's teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of the increment, this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities in the teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.

Original languageEnglish
Article number043036
JournalNew Journal of Physics
Volume10
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 21 2008

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education
games
maintenance
inhomogeneity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Physics and Astronomy(all)

Cite this

Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation. / Szolnoki, A.; Perc, Matjaž.

In: New Journal of Physics, Vol. 10, 043036, 21.04.2008.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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