Accuracy in strategy imitations promotes the evolution of fairness in the spatial ultimatum game

A. Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc, G. Szabó

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

47 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Spatial structure has a profound effect on the outcome of evolutionary games. In the ultimatum game, it leads to the dominance of much fairer players than those predicted to evolve in well-mixed settings. Here we show that spatiality leads to fair ultimatums only if the intervals from which the players are able to choose how much to offer and how little to accept are sufficiently fine-grained. Small sets of discrete strategies lead to the stable coexistence of the two most rational strategies in the set, while larger sets lead to the dominance of a single yet not necessarily the fairest strategy. The fairest outcome is obtained for the most accurate strategy imitation, that is in the limit of a continuous strategy set. Having a multitude of choices is thus crucial for the evolution of fairness, but not necessary for the evolution of empathy.

Original languageEnglish
Article number28005
JournalEPL
Volume100
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2012

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  • Physics and Astronomy(all)

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Accuracy in strategy imitations promotes the evolution of fairness in the spatial ultimatum game. / Szolnoki, A.; Perc, Matjaz; Szabó, G.

In: EPL, Vol. 100, No. 2, 28005, 10.2012.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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