A survey of interdependent information security games

Aron Laszka, Mark Felegyhazi, Levente Buttyan

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

61 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Risks faced by information system operators and users are not only determined by their own security posture, but are also heavily affected by the security-related decisions of others. This interdependence between information system operators and users is a fundamental property that shapes the efficiency of security defense solutions. Game theory is the most appropriate method to model the strategic interactions between these participants. In this survey, we summarize game-Theoretic interdependence models, characterize the emerging security inefficiencies, and present mechanisms to improve the security decisions of the participants. We focus our attention on games with interdependent defenders and do not discuss two-player attacker-defender games. Our goal is to distill the main insights from the state of the art and to identify the areas that need more attention from the research community.

Original languageEnglish
Article number23
JournalACM Computing Surveys
Volume47
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 1 2014

Keywords

  • Externality
  • Interdependent security
  • Security economics
  • Security games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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